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INTRODUCTION
Most death row inmates today face execution by lethal injection through
a series of compounded lethal drugs. However, this lethal injection method
has only become standard practice within the last decade.1 Traditionally, state
correctional facilities conducted executions using manufactured drugs, which
national pharmaceutical companies produced at industry-grade standards.
Starting in 2010, states began running out of manufactured drugs when
pharmaceutical companies placed distribution restrictions on such drugs to
ensure that states could not obtain the drugs for use in lethal injections.2
Furthermore, a court order eﬀectively blocked foreign imports of a
misbranded drug that several state correctional departments had turned to
for lethal injections.3 This drug shortage crisis caused states to settle for a
solution that would allow lethal injection to continue uninterrupted: sourcing
drugs from local compounders.4
Compounded lethal drugs are mixed by individuals at local shops according
to their own specifications and are widely regarded to be less safe than
manufactured drugs.5 These drugs receive little government oversight in their
production. Although the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has statutory
authority to regulate compounded lethal drugs, it has consistently refused to do
so.6 Instead, the federal government has mostly left regulation of compounders
to the states.7 Despite being responsible for licensing and overseeing
1 For an overview of lethal injection’s origins and development, see Deborah W. Denno, The
Lethal Injection Quandary: How Medicine Has Dismantled the Death Penalty, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 49,
64-77 (2007).
2 German Lopez, How a Shortage of Lethal Injection Drugs Put the Death Penalty Before the Supreme
Court, VOX (June 29, 2015), https://www.vox.com/2015/3/27/8301357/death-penalty-lethal-injection
[https://perma.cc/5RL5-CY95].
3 See Cook v. FDA, 733 F.3d 1, 3 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
4 See Ross Levitt & Deborah Feyerick, Death Penalty States Scramble for Lethal Injection Drugs, CNN
(Nov. 16, 2013), https://www-m.cnn.com/2013/11/15/justice/states-lethal-injection-drugs [https://perma.cc/
78YG-YRG2] (describing how states were resorting to procedures never before used in execution history
such as trying new drug combinations or going to compounding pharmacies).
5 See Compounding Pharmacies, DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER, https://deathpenalty
info.org/compounding-pharmacies [https://perma.cc/G5DW-CBQR] (last visited Apr. 14, 2019)
(discussing the dangers associated with compounding pharmacies and lethal injection).
6 See, e.g., Reply Brief for Appellants at 19, Cook, 733 F.3d 1 (Nos. 12-5176, 12-5266) [hereinafter
FDA Brief] (“[The] FDA . . . decline[s] to take enforcement action in the narrow category of cases
in which drugs are destined for use by States in accordance with their lethal injection laws.”);
Telephone Interview with Chris McDaniel, Investigative Reporter, BuzzFeed News (Jan. 8, 2019)
(“The FDA does not regulate lethal injection. It does not want to regulate lethal injection.”).
7 See Compounding and the FDA: Questions and Answers, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
https://www.fda.gov/drugs/guidancecomplianceregulatoryinformation/pharmacycompounding/ucm3
39764.htm [https://perma.cc/2X5Z-LKAH] (last updated June 21, 2018) (“Generally, state boards of
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compounders, some states have passed laws that insulate these compounders
from regulation by state boards of pharmacy, medicine, and health.8 In fact, over
twenty states have passed secrecy laws or engaged in practices that forbid public
disclosure of their suppliers’ identities in order to encourage compounders to
enter into contracts to supply states compounded lethal drugs.9
Non-regulation of compounded lethal drugs has contributed to a disturbing
series of botched executions. In 2012, a death-row inmate’s heart continued to
beat for at least twenty minutes after South Dakota officials injected him with
compounded lethal drugs for execution.10 In 2014, an Arizona death-row inmate
died after two hours of “gasping and snorting.”11 Five of the eleven men
executed in Texas in 2018 indicated in their final moments that they could feel
the compounded drugs burning their bodies inside out.12
Non-regulation of compounded lethal drugs also poses profound dangers
to the public. A 2018 article in the Journal of the American Pharmacists
Association observed that an unregulated supply chain of these substandard
drugs threatens the general public:
With states increasingly using compounded medicines in executions, there is a
greater risk that non-pharmaceutical-grade, substandard or contaminated
product will enter the United States market . . . . The secrecy surrounding the
execution drug procurement practices of death-penalty states risks undermining
channels for the importation of medicines that are otherwise safe and effective.
Once an illicit supply channel is established with a supplier, it is extremely
challenging to control which drug products move through it and which
customers they reach, particularly in a context where the FDA, DEA [Drug
Enforcement Administration], and state boards of pharmacy are prevented from
pharmacy have primary responsibility for the day-to-day oversight of state-licensed pharmacies that
are not registered with [the] FDA as outsourcing facilities.”).
8 See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-234 (2019) (“The compounding of such drugs pursuant to
the terms of such a contract . . . is not subject to the jurisdiction of the Board of Pharmacy, the
Board of Medicine, or the Department of Health Professions . . . .”).
9 For a full list, see State by State Lethal Injection Protocols, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR.,
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/state-lethal-injection [https://perma.cc/VR54-R88L] (last visited Apr.
14, 2019) [hereinafter State by State Lethal Injection Protocols].
10 Laura Sullivan, Missouri Execution Stalled over Lethal Drugs in Short Supply, NPR (Feb. 18, 2014),
https://www.npr.org/2014/02/18/279216377/missouri-execution-stalled-over-lethal-drugs-in-short-supply
[https://perma.cc/CQ33-HT6N].
11 Ellen Killoran, Arizona Botched Lethal Injection: Secrecy, Compounding Pharmacies and the
Eighth Amendment, INT’L BUS. TIMES (July 26, 2014), https://www.ibtimes.com/arizona-botchedlethal-injection-secrecy-compounding-pharmacies-eighth-amendment-1639770 [https://perma.cc/
YK2W-KPU3].
12 Chris McDaniel, Inmates Said the Drug Burned as They Died. This Is How Texas Gets Its Execution
Drugs., BUZZFEED NEWS (Nov. 28, 2018), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/chrismcdaniel/inmatessaid-the-drug-burned-as-they-died-this-is-how-texas?fbclid=IwAR0qLzEqTvbRaL-VJx_UmXT3ravJEyt
_-lMgESWiu14VtE8YHmmDJToLx8g [https://perma.cc/TRF3-QZ3K].
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performing their usual regulatory duties. These practices also create the risk that
substandard execution drugs fall directly into the wider patient population. This
has already happened in the manufactured drug context in several documented
instances in which lethal injection drugs were diverted into the patient market.13

Constitutional litigation is one strategy to urge state or federal governments
to regulate compounded lethal drugs. However, if the Supreme Court’s past
rulings on the constitutionality of lethal injection provide any clue, it is unlikely
the Court would find execution by these unregulated, compounded lethal drugs
to be unconstitutional.14 This Comment takes a different path of urging
regulation by focusing on administrative litigation against the FDA.
Compounded drugs used in lethal injection are, after all, drugs. A core
component of the FDA’s mission is to regulate drugs. It is the Food and Drug
Administration. And yet the FDA refuses to regulate these drugs.
The FDA can refuse to regulate these drugs because the law insulates its
inaction from judicial review. While courts regularly conduct arbitrary and
capricious review of agency enforcement actions, they are far more reluctant
to review agency inaction. In fact, the Supreme Court has created a
presumption against judicial review of agency inaction.15 The basic idea
behind this principle is that agencies are far better positioned than courts to
know how to allocate regulatory priorities against scarce resources to achieve
their statutory duties.16 So, the reasoning goes, courts should not be in the
business of second-guessing agency inaction. This presumption is powerful
because it closes the door to litigants at the outset of litigation regardless of
how strong their claims are on the merits. Simply put, courts are foreclosed
from reviewing FDA inaction.
The presumption against judicial review seems unreasonable when the
stakes are so high for death row inmates and the public at large. Although the
presumption against judicial review may be a sound principle generally, the
FDA’s refusal to regulate compounded lethal drugs is the kind of agency inaction
that one might think necessitates at least some judicial scrutiny. I therefore
propose creating a narrow avenue of judicial review for cases like these. My rule,
13 Prashant Yadav et al., When Government Agencies Turn to Unregulated Drug Sources: Implications for
the Drug Supply Chain and Public Health Are Grave, 58 J. AM. PHARMACISTS ASS’N 477, 479 (2018).
14 See, e.g., Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2731 (2015) (rejecting petitioner’s argument that
Oklahoma’s off-label use of midazolam in executions carried a demonstrated risk of severe pain, even
though it had led to several recent botched executions); see also Bucklew v. Precythe, 139 S. Ct. 1112, 1118–
19, 1133 (2019) (declining to find that the intended method of execution was unconstitutional because the
petitioner failed to provide a sufficiently detailed plan on how he would be executed through an
alternative, feasible method associated with a significantly lower risk of severe pain).
15 See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985) (“[A]n agency’s decision not to take
enforcement action should be presumed immune from judicial review . . . .”).
16 See id. at 831-32 (“The agency is far better equipped than the courts to deal with the many
variables involved in the proper ordering of its priorities.”).
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what I will call “discrete look,” identifies opportunities for judicial review that
are sensible and manageable for the courts to engage in, while also keeping these
avenues sufficiently narrow to respect the underlying policy rationales of the
existing doctrine. Under discrete look, when death row inmates sue the FDA for
its failure to regulate compounded lethal drugs, courts can no longer treat the
FDA’s inaction as an exercise of unreviewable enforcement discretion.
This Comment first establishes in Part I that the FDA has jurisdiction to
regulate compounded lethal drugs. This is an important premise because an
agency’s duty to regulate presupposes that it has jurisdiction to regulate in the
first place. Part I then moves on to show that under existing case law, the FDA
is not subject to judicial review for refusing to regulate compounded lethal
drugs. In Part II, I propose a rule, which I label “discrete look,” that would
allow judicial review in cases like these. My rule is broad in the sense that it is
not bound to the context of lethal injection, but it is narrow in the sense that
it requires plaintiffs to meet a test to qualify for judicial review. Part II then
applies discrete look to the case of lethal injections to show that the FDA’s
inaction in that context would be subject to judicial review. Finally, I discuss
the general benefits discrete look brings to administrative law.

I. REVIEW UNDER CURRENT LAW
Section A of this Part shows that the FDA can regulate compounded lethal
drugs. It first explains the statutory framework for FDA jurisdiction. Next, it
discusses how two states have responded to claims about FDA jurisdiction.
Finally, it addresses objections that Congress did not intend the FDA to have
jurisdiction and that jurisdiction would produce an absurd outcome.
Section B ﬁrst describes the Supreme Court case that created the
presumption against judicial review of agency inaction. Then it discusses how
the circuit courts have developed this doctrine. It concludes that under
existing law, FDA inaction toward compounded lethal drugs is unreviewable.
A. The FDA Has Jurisdiction to Regulate Compounded Lethal Drugs
The FDA can regulate compounded lethal drugs because they are “new
drugs.” The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) charges the FDA
to regulate the interstate activity of new drugs, which the statute deﬁnes as
any drug “the composition of which is such that such drug is not generally
recognized . . . as safe and eﬀective . . . .”17 For new drugs to enter the market,
they must undergo an expensive and lengthy FDA clinical trial process to

17

21 U.S.C. § 321(p)(1) (2018).
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establish that they are “safe and eﬀective.”18 Although the FDA’s statutory
framework never expressly says that compounded lethal drugs are new drugs,
the statute’s text requires this conclusion for two reasons.
First, a compounded drug is a new drug because of the term’s broad
deﬁnition. Compounders create new drugs all the time when they compound
because the act of compounding requires mixing existing drugs to achieve a
unique composition as the end product. As the Fifth Circuit noted in a case
turning on this very issue,
If a compounder changes the composition of an approved drug—by mixing or
combining an approved drug with something else to create a different substance
or by creating special dosage or delivery forms of an approved drug inconsistent
with a drug’s labeling—the composition of the individualized concoction
created by a compounding pharmacist will not have been previously approved
for use. The resulting substance is therefore a ‘new drug.’19

Second, the structure of the FDA’s statutory scheme assumes that
compounded drugs are new drugs. The 1997 Food and Drug Administration
Modernization Act (FDAMA) empowered the FDA to regulate
compounders.20 The relevant provision declared that the FDA’s new drug
requirements “shall not apply” to a compounded drug product “if the drug
product meets the requirements of this section.”21 Because the Act allows
compounders to be exempt from new drug regulations only if compounders
met certain exemption conditions, compounded drugs are by deﬁnition new
drugs—otherwise, there would be no need for Congress to create the
exemption. As the Fifth Circuit observed, it is “‘a cardinal principle of
statutory construction’ that a statute be construed such that ‘no clause
sentence, or word shall be superﬂuous, void or insigniﬁcant.’”22 Since the
lethal drugs discussed in this Comment are compounded, they must also by
deﬁnition be new drugs.23
Although compounders are exempt from the FDA’s new drug regulations
when they meet certain exemption conditions, they fail to meet these
exceptions here. The FDA has provided guidance documents that detail these
exemption conditions. One guidance document highlighted the ﬁrst statutory
exemption condition as key: “[t]he drug product is compounded for an
18 See id. § 355(b) (detailing process for new human drugs); id. § 360b(b) (detailing process for
new animal drugs).
19 Med. Ctr. Pharmacy v. Mukasey, 536 F.3d 383, 395 (5th Cir. 2008).
20 Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-115, § 503A, 111
Stat. 2296, 2328 (codiﬁed at 21 U.S.C. § 353(a) (2018)).
21 § 353a(a).
22 Mukasey, 536 F.3d at 406 (quoting Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001)).
23 Id.
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identiﬁed individual patient based on the receipt of a valid prescription order,
or a notation, approved by the prescribing practitioner . . . .” 24 A second
guidance document elaborated that “a valid prescription order for a
compounded drug product means a valid prescription order from a licensed
physician or other licensed practitioner authorized by state law to prescribe
drugs (prescriber).”25 The guidance explained that statutory conditions to
exemption exist “to help ensure that compounding . . . is based on individual
patient needs . . . [and that compounders] are not actually operating as
conventional manufacturers.”26
Here, state correctional facilities are not exempt from the FDA’s new drug
regulation because they cannot meet the exemption conditions. Consider the
oﬃcial advisory opinion that Virginia’s Attorney General wrote to Virginia
state legislators in 2016 on this very question. In his opinion, the Attorney
General examined the exemption conditions in the 1997 Act and admitted
that Virginia’s lethal injection system failed to meet the exemption condition
that required a valid prescription for an identiﬁed individual patient.27
Virginia understandably lacks this kind of prescription because the
Hippocratic Oath—the ethical creed of the medical profession—specifically
upholds that “[t]o please no one will I prescribe a deadly drug . . . .”28
Likewise, the American Medical Association (AMA)’s Code of Medical Ethics
states that “as a member of a profession dedicated to preserving life when there
is hope of doing so, a physician must not participate in a legally authorized
execution.”29 The Code specifies that participation includes “[p]rescribing or
administering . . . medications that are part of the execution procedure.”30
Interestingly, Georgia is an outlier state in its attempt to create a valid
prescription for these drugs. According to a news report, Georgia has contracted
a doctor—whose identity is specifically protected by a secrecy law—to write
24 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., PHARMACY COMPOUNDING OF HUMAN DRUG PRODUCTS
UNDER SECTION 503A OF THE FEDERAL FOOD, DRUG, AND COSMETIC ACT 3 (2016)
[hereinafter PHARMACY COMPOUNDING GUIDANCE] (citing § 353a(a)).
25 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., PRESCRIPTION REQUIREMENT UNDER SECTION 503A OF
THE FEDERAL FOOD, DRUG, AND COSMETIC ACT 7 (2016).
26 Id. at 5.
27 Virginia Attorney General Mark R. Herring, Opinion Letter at 6-7, 9 (Apr. 19, 2016)
[hereinafter Herring Opinion], https://www.oag.state.va.us/ﬁles/Opinions/2016/Miller_et_al__16014.pdf [https://perma.cc/P2TR-72GN]. However, the Attorney General opined that despite the
fact that Virginia’s compounded drugs used for lethal injection did not have a prescription, he did
not think that lethal compounded drugs were subject to FDA regulation. Id.
28 Hippocratic Oath, FREE DICTIONARY, https://medical-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/
Hippocratic+oath [https://perma.cc/QZ2R-9G76] (last visited on Apr. 14, 2019).
29 Capital Punishment: Code of Medical Ethics Opinion 9.7.3, AM. MED. ASS’N, https://www.amaassn.org/delivering-care/ethics/capital-punishment [https://perma.cc/7MAX-7MP5] (last visited April
14, 2019).
30 Id.
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prescription orders for individual inmates on death row.31 The doctor sends the
“prescription order” to the compounder with the name and information of the
inmate, listing the inmate as the individual “patient.”32 However, Georgia’s
practice does not undermine the FDA’s jurisdictional reach for two reasons.
First, a state must surmount the challenge of showing that a valid
prescription order can even exist for something like compounded lethal
drugs. Federal regulations state that in order for a “prescription for a
controlled substance to be eﬀective [it] must be issued for a legitimate
medical purpose by an individual practitioner acting in the usual course of his
professional practice.”33 Compounded lethal drugs are not on the list of
“controlled substances,” but they seem to share the same, if not greater,
qualities for abusive and dangerous use as controlled substances.34 Although
this particular regulation does not bar a prescription order for compounded
lethal drugs, it demonstrates that federal regulators reserve valid
prescriptions of dangerous substances for medical reasons that arise in
everyday practice. In light of the Hippocratic Oath and the AMA’s position
against such prescriptions, Georgia’s insistence that it uses a valid
prescription order becomes even weaker.
Second, even if Georgia can avoid regulation, its method appears to be
the exception and not the rule. I could not locate another state that also uses
a “prescription order” for every death row “patient.” Indeed, if Georgia’s
strategy were a viable way to be exempt from new drug regulation and a
model for other states, Virginia’s Attorney General would not have candidly
admitted in an oﬃcial advisory opinion in 2016 that such a prescription order
was “unavailable” and therefore a compounder would facially fail one of the
statutory exemption conditions.35 Thus for purposes of my discussion, I can
safely assume that the FDA would still have jurisdiction of compounded
lethal drugs in most states.
Still, one might object that Congress did not intend the FDA to have
jurisdiction over compounded lethal drugs when it passed the FDAMA. This
congressional-intent objection takes two forms. The first argues that Congress’s
intent to solve a problem was not broad enough to cover the particular issue
now in question. The second argues that Congress would not have intended the

31 Bill Rankin, The Secrets of the Death Penalty, ATLANTA J.-CONST. (Oct. 24, 2015),
https://www.ajc.com/news/local/the-secrets-the-death-penalty/4MGsZNIPtwg0h9Mg1yolpO/ [https://
perma.cc/2BCX-TNQ8].
32 Id.
33 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04(a) (2018).
34 Cf., e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 802(6) (2018) (“The term ‘controlled substance’ means a drug or other
substance, or immediate precursor, included in schedule I, II, III, IV, or V . . . .”).
35 See Herring Opinion, supra note 27, at 6-7.
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statute it created to be interpreted to arrive at an absurd result. Neither is
persuasive here.
The ﬁrst objection amounts to a debate about scope. The U.S. Senate
Labor and Human Resources Committee Report indicated that limited FDA
regulation was needed to “prevent small-scale manufacturing under the guise
of compounding.”36 Since compounded lethal drugs, the argument goes, are
not produced in bulk or commercially available to the public, they do not
implicate Congress’s concern about manufacturers in disguise.
This argument about congressional intent, however, does not produce such
a narrow result. In passing the 1997 FDAMA to modernize the FDA’s regulatory
toolkit, Congress seemed concerned about any kind of compounding that was
not based on legitimate individual patient needs. The same Senate Committee
Report noted that “[t]he exemptions . . . are limited to compounding for an
individual patient based on the medical need of such patient for the particular
drug compounded.37 The Report continued: “To qualify for the exemptions, the
pharmacist or physician must be able to cite a legitimate medical need for the
compounded product that would explain why a commercially available drug
product would not be appropriate.”38 Further, according to the FDA, even
compounders who are exempt from new drug regulations can still be subject to
a series of other FDA regulations.39 These include requirements for sanitary
packing conditions, purity and strength levels, and labeling, advertising, and
promotion that is not false or misleading.40 This shows that Congress intended
the 1997 FDAMA to empower the FDA to have at least some regulatory
authority over all compounders—a wider intent than simply stopping
commercial manufacturers in disguise.
Further, statutes can cover speciﬁc problems that Congress did not, or
could not, anticipate. As the Supreme Court underscored, “statutory
prohibitions often go beyond the principal evil to cover reasonably
comparable evils, and it is ultimately the provisions of our laws rather than
the principal concerns of our legislators by which we are governed.”41
Congress did not think about lethal compounders when it acted in 1997
because they did not exist: the ﬁrst recorded use of compounded lethal drugs

S. REP. NO. 105–43, at 67 (1997).
Id.
Id. at 67-68.
See PHARMACY COMPOUNDING GUIDANCE, supra note 24, at 6-7.
Id.
Oncale v. Sundownder Oﬀshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998); see also Brett M.
Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2118, 2143-2144 (2016) (reviewing
ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES (2014)) (“Chief Judge Katzmann puts it well: ‘it is
unreasonable to expect Congress to anticipate all interpretive questions that may present themselves
in the future,’ particularly when Congress operates under strict ‘time pressures.’”).
36
37
38
39
40
41
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occurred in 2012.42 But Congress did seem to express a general intent. The
FDAMA “enhanced FDA’s mission in ways that recognized the Agency
would be operating in a 21st century characterized by increasing
technological, trade and public health complexities.”43 Congress recognized
the growth and widespread use of compounding compared to traditional
manufacturing. It was concerned about compounders deviating from their
socially useful and acceptable purpose—mixing drugs to suit the needs of
individual patients—into other areas that would raise generalizable problems
worthy of federal regulation. That Congress did not anticipate at the time
that exemption conditions would empower it to regulate compounded lethal
drugs says little. What matters is that Congress felt comfortable forgoing
federal regulation of compounding only where the compounding occurred for
a narrow and individualized purpose.
The second objection from congressional intent relies on the absurdity
doctrine, also known as the “elephant-in-mousehole” principle.44 In FDA v.
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., the Supreme Court rejected the FDA’s
attempt to regulate tobacco products, reasoning that despite the statute’s
broad deﬁnition of “drug” and “device,” the FDA’s statutory scheme and
congressional activity suﬃciently indicated that Congress had not given the
FDA authority over tobacco and tobacco marketing.45
The Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) has relied on Brown and the absurdity
doctrine to claim that the FDA does not have jurisdiction over any articles,
including lethal drugs, used in executions.46 Its argument proceeds as follows:
1.

A core mission of the FDA is to ensure that drugs and devices are
“safe.”47 This means that the drug’s or device’s therapeutic attributes
outweigh its risk of harm.48

42 See
Compounding
Pharmacies,
DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER,
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/executions/lethal-injection/compounding-pharmacies [https://perma.cc/
K5GM-Rh43] (last visited Oct. 21, 2019) [hereinafter Compounding Pharmacies].
43 Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act (FDAMA) of 1997, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
https://www.fda.gov/regulatoryinformation/lawsenforcedbyfda/signiﬁcantamendmentstothefdcact/
fdama/default.htm [https://perma.cc/P22N-M8R3] (last updated Mar. 29, 2018).
44 See Whitman v. American Trucking Association, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001) (“Congress, we have
held, does not alter the fundamental details of a regulatory scheme in vague terms or ancillary
provisions—it does not, one might say, hide elephants in mouseholes.”).
45 529 U.S. 120, 126 (2000).
46 Whether the Food & Drug Admin. Has Jurisdiction over Articles Intended for Use in
Lawful Executions, slip op. at 1, 1-2 (Oﬃce of Legal Counsel May 3, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/
olc/opinion/ﬁle/1162686/download [https://perma.cc/FM2Q-BFPJ].
47 See id. at 11 (noting that “[u]nder the FDCA, a ‘new drug’ may not go to market unless FDA
determines . . . that the substance is ‘safe’ and ‘eﬀective[]’”) (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 355(d)(1) (2018)).
48 Id. (“[A] drug is unsafe if its potential for inﬂicting death . . . is not oﬀset by the possibility
of therapeutic beneﬁt.” (quoting United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 556 (1979))).
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Execution drugs and devices are inherently unsafe because they are
used for death, not therapy.49 So if the FDA could regulate them, it
would have to ban them outright.50
The Constitution and federal statutes expressly allow the death penalty.51
Therefore, it cannot be the case that Congress intended the FDA to
have jurisdiction over articles used in executions.52

As an initial matter, this Comment does not take a position on whether
the FDA should ban lethal injection drugs. This Comment’s discussion does
not turn on resolving that particular issue, and at any rate the OLC’s
absurdity theory is unpersuasive for three reasons.
First, even if FDA jurisdiction over compounded lethal drugs required
the FDA to ban them outright, this does not necessarily violate Congress’s
intent. In Brown, the Supreme Court pointed to six separate pieces of
legislation addressing tobacco use and human health, along with a failed
congressional attempt to extend FDA jurisdiction to tobacco, to arrive at the
conclusion that “Congress has persistently acted to preclude a meaningful
role for any administrative agency in making policy on the subject of tobacco
and health.”53 By contrast, in this case, Congress has not persistently spoken
on the viability of lethal injection as a method of execution—in fact, it has
not spoken on the issue at all. Congress has approved of the death penalty,
but it has not set up a federal death penalty scheme where lethal injection is
the exclusive—or even listed—form of execution.54
Not only is this case distinguishable from Brown, it is also analogous to a
case where a court expressly rejected the absurdity objection. In Cook v. FDA,
the D.C. Circuit Court aﬃrmed the district court’s permanent injunction
requiring the FDA to forbid the import of sodium thiopental, a critical
anesthetic used in executions.55 In that case, a provision of the FDCA
required the FDA to refuse admission of misbranded or unapproved new
drugs into the country.56 The D.C. Circuit ruled that since the imported
anesthetic was a misbranded and unapproved new drug, the FDA was
49 Id. (“[T]here is no way products intended to carry out capital punishment could ever satisfy
that [cost-beneﬁt] test . . . .”).
50 Id. at 12-13 (“In sum, if articles intended for use in capital punishment were regulated as
‘drugs’ or ‘devices,’ then the FDCA would prohibit them altogether.”).
51 Id. at 10 (“[T]he Constitution and laws of the United States presuppose the continued
availability of capital punishment for the most heinous federal and state crimes.”).
52 Id. at 26.
53 FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 156 (2000), superseded by statute,
Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, 123 Stat. 1776 (2009).
54 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3591-3599 (2018).
55 733 F.3d 1, 3 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
56 Id. at 7.
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required to seize the drugs rather than allow them to be delivered to state
correctional facilities for use in lethal injection.57 The court recognized the
stakes of the case by acknowledging that sodium thiopental was no longer in
domestic production.58 Nonetheless, it aﬃrmed the permanent injunction,
which appeared to eﬀectively block the last remaining source of the critical
anesthetic.59 In reaching this conclusion, the court expressly rejected the
argument that this was an absurd result, citing Supreme Court precedent for
the proposition that “the Court rarely invokes the absurdity test to override
unambiguous legislation.”60
Cook is instructive to this case. There, the unambiguous import statute led
to a ban on an unapproved new drug that was critical to lethal injection. Here,
the statutory exemption conditions for compounders is equally unambiguous,
and therefore a ban on unapproved compounded lethal drugs should be no
less consistent with Congress’s intent.
While a ban may be permissible, FDA jurisdiction over lethal
compounded drugs would not automatically require it. As the Cook court
observed, “The FDA may exercise enforcement discretion to allow the
domestic distribution of a misbranded or unapproved new drug, as the
Supreme Court recognized in Chaney.”61 The FDA could turn that
enforcement discretion into ensuring that compounded lethal drugs are safer
and more eﬀective, rather than banning them outright. For example, the FDA
could enter into agreements with compounders to ensure that their
procedures for producing compounded lethal drugs are more comparable to
industry-grade standards. This arrangement is consistent with both Chaney
and this Comment’s argument. Under Chaney, the FDA’s enforcement
discretion provides it regulatory options besides an outright ban, as Cook
observed. And as I discuss in Part II of my Comment, the FDA will be doing
its job as long as it is engaging in some level of enforcement, including
through informal means.
The second reason the OLC opinion is unpersuasive is because one could
argue that not all compounded lethal drugs necessarily fail the FDA’s
definition of “safe.” As the Cook court noted, many states conduct lethal
injection using a three-drug cocktail, the first of which “induces anesthesia.”62
The anesthetic arguably performs a therapeutic function—namely, rendering
the person unconscious so that their body does not experience any pain from
Id. at 10-11.
Id. at 4, 10-11.
Id. at 1, 4.
Id. at 9 (quoting Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 459 (2002) (internal
brackets omitted)).
61 Id. at 9-10.
62 Id. at 4.
57
58
59
60
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the second drug, which paralyzes the body, and the third drug, which stops the
heart.63 The administration of the anesthetic “is critical because absent ‘a
proper dose . . . render[ing] the prisoner unconscious, there is a substantial,
constitutionally unacceptable risk of suffocation from the administration of
[the second drug] and pain from the injection of [the third drug].’”64 Insofar
as the anesthetic can pass the cost-benefit requirement to be considered “safe,”
the second premise of the OLC opinion falters and the FDA does not have to
ban the anesthetic, thus avoiding the allegedly absurd result. At the very least,
then, the FDA has some jurisdiction over some compounded lethal drugs.65
The third reason the OLC opinion is unpersuasive is because this case
does not implicate the same concerns as Brown. The Brown majority had good
reason to deny the FDA from running with an admittedly broad deﬁnition
of “device” to regulate an entire industry, after decades of Congress’s own
involvement in the ﬁeld. However, that is not the case here. This case presents
an issue the FDA is intimately familiar with: drugs that are injected into the
human body to aﬀect its functions—a quintessential area of the FDA’s
expertise. Nor would FDA regulation catch lethal compounders oﬀ guard.
Compounders as an industry have operated under FDA regulation since the
1997 FDAMA. When the ﬁrst known execution by compounded lethal drugs
happened 15 years later in 2012, compounders were voluntarily creating a new
product knowing that it would enter into an existing regulatory scheme.66
To summarize, the FDA can regulate compounded lethal drugs because
they are “new drugs.” Compounders cannot be exempt from the FDA’s new
drug regulations because they are not creating lethal drugs for an identified
individual patient based on the receipt of a valid prescription order. Objections
to this conclusion focused on congressional intent are ultimately unpersuasive,
as Congress’s intent is broad enough to address this issue. And including
Id.
Id. (quoting Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 53 (2008)) (ellipses and ﬁrst alteration in original).
I refer to the anesthetic, which arguably performs a therapeutic function when used in a
three-drug cocktail, as a compounded lethal drug for two reasons. First, this facilitates ease of
reference without aﬀecting the legal analysis: a compounded anesthetic is still a new drug that is
subject to FDA regulation absent satisfying the FDA’s exemption conditions. Second, the anesthetic
used in lethal injections comes in dosages signiﬁcantly higher than that used in medicinal contexts.
See, e.g., Gray v. McAuliﬀe, No. 3:16CV982-HEH, 2017 WL 102970, at *9 (E.D. Va. Jan. 10, 2017)
(“The VDOC will use 500 mg of midazolam as its ﬁrst-stage drug in the three-drug lethal injection
protocol. Midazolam is used as a sedative. It is a central nervous system and respiratory depressant
. . . . [M]uch smaller amounts of midazolam are used for medicinal or therapeutic purposes.”); Reid
v. Johnson, 333 F. Supp. 2d 543, 546–47 (E.D. Va. 2004) (“The ﬁrst drug, sodium thiopental is a
barbiturate sedative. Two grams of sodium thiopental [used in execution] is approximately ﬁve to
eight times the dosage that would be used to render a 176 pound individual unconscious for general
surgery.”). Thus I can safely assume that compounders are creating this anesthetic for the purpose
of lethal injection, which makes grouping the drugs together appropriate.
66 See Compounding Pharmacies, supra note 42.
63
64
65
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compounded lethal drugs within the FDA’s jurisdiction would not lead to an
absurd result.
This Section demonstrated that the FDA has jurisdiction to regulate
compounded lethal drugs. Having established this basic premise, this Comment
next turns to explore whether the FDA can be subject to judicial review for
refusing to regulate compounded lethal drugs under that jurisdiction.
B. FDA Inaction Is Unreviewable Under Existing Law
The landmark Supreme Court case Heckler v. Chaney established the
presumption against judicial review of agency inaction.67 In that case,
plaintiﬀs were death row inmates asking the FDA to halt their execution by
lethal injection and to seize such drugs.68 Plaintiﬀs claimed that the drugs
were new and misbranded drugs, and alternatively “suggested that the
FDCA’s requirements for approval of ‘new drugs’ applied . . . .”69 The
Supreme Court refused to address the case on the merits and instead
announced that “an agency’s decision not to take enforcement action should
be presumed immune from judicial review . . . .”70 The Court observed that
many reasons justify the general “unsuitability” of judicial review:
[A]n agency decision not to enforce often involves a complicated balancing of
a number of factors which are peculiarly within its expertise. Thus, the agency
must not only assess whether a violation has occurred, but whether agency
resources are best spent on this violation or another, whether the agency is
likely to succeed if it acts, whether the particular enforcement action requested
best fits the agency’s overall policies, and, indeed, whether the agency has
enough resources to undertake the action at all. An agency generally cannot
act against each technical violation of the statute it is charged with enforcing.
The agency is far better equipped than the courts to deal with the many
variables involved in the proper ordering of its priorities.71

There is, however, a way to rebut this presumption of unreviewability. In
a footnote, Chaney acknowledges that the presumption could be overcome
where the agency has “consciously and expressly adopted a general policy that
is so extreme as to amount to an abdication of its statutory responsibilities.”72

470 U.S. 821 (1985).
Id. at 823-24.
Id.
Id. at 832.
Id. at 831-32.
Id. at 833 n.4 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159
(D.C. Cir. 1973) (en banc)).
67
68
69
70
71
72
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Chaney did not elaborate on what abdication would look like, but the
circuit courts have provided a clearer picture of this exception.73 The circuit
courts that have developed the abdication doctrine can be grouped into two
categories. The ﬁrst line of circuits (“Line 1”) conducts the abdication analysis
by looking to what the agency has done with respect to regulation. The second
line of circuits (“Line 2”) conducts the abdication analysis by examining what
the agency has said with respect to regulation. The two lines appear to be
mutually exclusive, meaning that each articulates its own requirement of what
must be met to allow for judicial review.
In Line 1 cases, courts look to what the agency does. Courts have refused
to ﬁnd abdication so long as agencies maintain some level of enforcement
activity over the issue identiﬁed in the statutory charge. This principle aligns
closely with the observation of the Chaney Court that “[t]he agency is far
better equipped than the courts to deal with the many variables involved in
the proper ordering of its priorities.”74
In operationalizing the concept of enforcement, Line 1 courts find no
abdication where agencies choose to settle with the regulated party,75 resort to
informal enforcement measures to effectively induce compliance,76 or decide
not to bring an enforcement action after a good-faith investigation.77
Enforcement thus encompasses the agency’s initial steps of looking into a
problem and deciding whether to take further action.78 Importantly, the court
conducts the abdication analysis by examining if there is at least some level of
73 None of the three Supreme Court cases since Chaney that discuss judicial review of agency
inaction directly address nonenforcement decisions. The ﬁrst case prohibits review of an agency’s
refusal to implement a programmatic proposal. See Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness All., 542 U.S. 55,
64 (2004). This is relevant to the discrete look rule I propose later, which would limit judicial review
to an agency’s refusal to take enforcement action against a private party’s violations. The second
case is not on point because it speciﬁcally limits its discussion of agency inaction to the context of
rulemaking. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 500 (2007). The third case is also not on point
because there the agency’s statute contained speciﬁc mandatory procedures that the Court said made
review possible, whereas the cases this Comment covers are not about procedural compliance. See
Mach Mining, LLC v. EEOC, 135 S. Ct. 1645, 1656 (2015).
74 Chaney, 470 U.S. at 831-32.
75 See, e.g., Garcia v. McCarthy, 649 F. App’x 589, 591 (9th Cir. 2016) (“[A]n agency’s decision
to settle falls under the penumbra of agency inaction that has traditionally been subject to a
rebuttable presumption against judicial review.”).
76 See, e.g., Block v. SEC, 50 F.3d 1078, 1084 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (“Thus, we cannot agree that the
Commission has refused to implement § 2(a)(19); the agency has merely chosen thus far to enforce
it informally rather than formally. So far, it appears, the Commission has found that suﬃcient to
induce compliance with the law.”).
77 See, e.g., Greer v. Chao, 492 F.3d 962, 967 (8th Cir. 2007) (“Among other actions, OFCCP
officials visited Eaton, discussed conditions with coworkers, and interviewed managers. These
investigatory steps are sufficient to indicate that the Secretary discharged her statutory obligations.”).
78 See id. at 965 (quoting Giacobbi v. Biermann, 780 F. Supp. 33, 37 (D.D.C. 1992)) (“[T]he
investigation itself, like the ﬁnal decision whether or not to take enforcement action, is within the
enforcement arena and therefore, committed to agency discretion.” (internal quotations omitted)).
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enforcement across cases. An agency may weigh its priorities and choose not
to enforce in particular cases while enforcing in other cases.79 A low level of
enforcement does not amount to abdication of statutory duty, because the
agency has discretion to choose the level of enforcement so long as it has not
“totally abdicated its statutory responsibility.”80
Here, judicial review of FDA inaction toward compounded lethal drugs
is unavailable under Line 1. The court will look to see if there is some level
of enforcement of the statutory charge. The FDA’s statutory charge, as
relevant here, is to regulate new drugs.81 That is a very broad mandate.
Compounded lethal drugs fall under new drug regulation, as argued earlier,
and therefore comprise a subset of new drugs.82 Suppose, for the sake of
argument, that the FDA’s enforcement level of new drugs is dangerously low
or even nonexistent. The FDA could simply increase its overall new drug
enforcement level while still leaving compounded lethal drugs completely
alone. A court following Line 1 will ﬁnd that the FDA has some level of
enforcement toward new drugs and thus cannot be subject to judicial review.
In Line 2 cases, courts look to what the agency says. Courts have refused
to ﬁnd abdication so long as agencies have not articulated a general
nonenforcement policy.83 The case that established this rule, Crowley
Caribbean Transport, Inc. v. Pena, involved a shipping company that contested
the Maritime Administrator’s grant of a shipping waiver to a competitor.84
The D.C. Circuit examined the Administrator’s correspondence letters with
both parties and found the Administrator’s waiver grant to be a “single-shot
non-enforcement decision.”85 The court found that the waiver did not
articulate a general policy and therefore the particular instance of
nonenforcement was not subject to judicial review.86 The court observed that
many agency documents, such as “side comments, form letters, litigation
79 See, e.g., Raymond Proﬃtt Found. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 343 F.3d 199, 211 (3d Cir.
2003) (“The Corps has decided, however, to continue to emphasize ﬂood control as the primary
objective of this particular facility, something the WRDA certainly permits it to do.”).
80 Madison-Hughes v. Shalala, 80 F.3d 1121, 1131 (6th Cir. 1996).
81 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (2018) (“No person shall introduce or deliver for introduction into
interstate commerce any new drug, unless an approval of an application ﬁled pursuant to subsection
(b) or (j) [of this section] is eﬀective with respect to such drug.”).
82 See supra text accompanying notes 17–23.
83 See, e.g., Salmon Spawning & Recovery All. v. U.S. Customs & Border Prot., 550 F.3d 1121,
1129 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (holding that abdication was not an issue in this case because plaintiﬀs did
not allege any express policy of non-enforcement); Riverkeeper v. Collins, 359 F.3d 156, 170-71 (2d
Cir. 2004) (holding that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)’s refusal to implement the
plaintiﬀ ’s proposed nuclear safety measures was unreviewable because the agency did not articulate
a policy expressly abdicating any relevant statutory authority).
84 37 F.3d 671, 672 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
85 Id. at 676.
86 Id.
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documents, and informal communications,” would not be reliable indicators
for the court to “tease[] out” a general nonenforcement policy.87 According to
the court, documents on this disfavored list indicate “the sort of mingled
assessments of fact, policy, and law that drive an individual enforcement
decision” of the nature that Chaney intended courts not to touch.88
The D.C. Circuit provided two categories of agency documents that it
would consider as general policies. One category consists of agency policies
articulated through the full rulemaking process.89 The other category consists
of agency policies articulated in the form of a “universal policy statement.”90
Further, while Crowley did not entirely rule out the possibility that agency
documents from the disfavored list could articulate a general policy,91 such a
category currently seems to be a null set: in the thirty years since Crowley was
decided, I could not ﬁnd a single court that has inferred a general
nonenforcement policy from a document on Crowley’s disfavored list.
Here, under Line 2, the FDA’s inaction toward compounded lethal drugs
will also not be subject to judicial review. The FDA has not articulated a
general nonenforcement policy. And either out of intentional desire to avoid
judicial review or simply the inertia of not needing to announce a policy of
inaction, the FDA will likely continue to remain silent. Even if it had zero
level of enforcement, the agency would not be subject to review because the
court can only look at what the FDA has said about its nonenforcement
policies. The best evidence that plaintiffs have of a general nonenforcement
policy is the FDA’s long-standing position that it declines to take enforcement
action “in the narrow category of cases in which drugs are destined for use by
States in accordance with their lethal injection laws.”92 But this policy statement
was made in a litigation document, which is on Crowley’s disfavored list.
Supposing that the court would allow the rare inference of a general policy from
litigation documents, the FDA could preempt this possibility by simply
omitting this language from its documents going forward. Furthermore, as with
Line 1, Line 2 seems to analyze policies at the general level of the statutory
charge. Thus, it is not clear that even a general nonenforcement policy toward
compounded lethal drugs would persuade a court that the FDA was
abdicating its duty of regulating new drugs.
This Section demonstrates that under the reasoning of either Line 1 or Line
2, FDA inaction is unreviewable. Yet it seems incomplete to rest abdication
analysis either exclusively on what an agency has done or what it has said at the
87
88
89
90
91
92

Id. at 677.
Id.
Id. at 676 (citing Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. EPA, 980 F.2d 765 (D.C. Cir. 1992)).
Id. (citing Edison Elec. Inst. v. EPA, 996 F.2d 326 (D.C. Cir. 1993)).
Id. at 677.
FDA Brief, supra note 6, at 19.
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general level of the statutory charge. This Comment next discusses the
problems with this case law and creates a new rule to fix those flaws.
II. REVIEW UNDER DISCRETE LOOK
I have shown that a challenge to FDA inaction is unreviewable under
existing case law. In this Part, I generalize the ﬂaws of the existing law and
propose a solution by introducing the discrete look rule. I then discuss how
the rule works in practice.
A. Discrete Look Described
Abdication analysis under the current circuit case law provides at best a
tiny peephole of judicial review. First, when courts look at agency inaction,
they only look at it in relation to the general level of the statutory charge.
They refuse to look below the statutory charge to any particular issue, or
“subset,” of the statutory charge, even if the agency is completely refusing to
enforce that subset. Second, when courts look at agency inaction, they look
either to what an agency has done to determine if some level of enforcement
exists or to what an agency has said about its enforcement policies, but not
both. It will be the rare case indeed where an agency engages in no level of
enforcement of its statutory charge or where an agency has announced a
general nonenforcement policy. Most agency refusal patterns are not that
broad in scope or that conspicuous in nature. So the existing framework
results in hardly any judicial review in practice. The high stakes of this case
for death row inmates and the public at large challenge the workability of this
rigid presumption against judicial review.
This Comment proposes a new rule to remedy these problems by opening
a narrow avenue for judicial review. Under this rule, abdication analysis can
occur at not just the general level of the statutory charge (the “statutory
level”), but also at any discrete subset of the statutory charge (the “discrete
level”). That is, a court can look at agency refusals to enforce a discrete subset
that falls within an agency’s broader statutory charge—a practice I have been
calling “discrete look.” Further, this Comment proposes a hybrid rule that
merges Line 1 and Line 2 so that they are no longer mutually exclusive;
meeting either will be suﬃcient to allow judicial review.
One might worry that a rule about discrete nonenforcement could be so
sweeping as to be unworkable or burdensome on the courts. Thus, this proposed
rule has two further constraints. First, the rule only applies to agency refusals
to take enforcement action against a private party’s violations. This prevents
agencies from being harassed for refusing to implement private proposals on
how best to go about doing their job. Second, the rule only applies when an
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agency’s refusal to enforce occurs against the backdrop of a unitary regulatory
scheme—that is, when no other regulator can step in to take action.
To summarize, the discrete look rule requires a court to conduct arbitrary
and capricious review of an agency’s (1) discrete (2) nonenforcement (3) of
violations (4) within a unitary regulatory scheme.
1. Discrete
Establishing a discrete subset requires passing a two-step test. First, the
desired target of regulation must fall within a subset of a statutory charge that
the agency is tasked to regulate. Courts should conduct this subset analysis
using Chevron deference toward the agency because the agency has the
expertise and policy tools to interpret the scope of its statutory duty.93 Under
Chevron, the court defers to an agency’s interpretation of ambiguity in the
statute so long as the agency’s interpretation is reasonable.94 For example, an
agency tasked with regulating vegetables might refuse to regulate tomatoes
because it ﬁnds “vegetable” to be an ambiguous word and reasonably
interprets it to exclude tomatoes. In that case, tomatoes are not a discrete
subset of all vegetables, because tomatoes are not reasonably understood by
the agency to be a subset in the ﬁrst place. As a result, the agency’s lack of
enforcement toward tomatoes should not be subject to judicial review.
Second, the desired object of regulation must be discrete. The MerriamWebster Dictionary deﬁnes “discrete” as “constituting a separate entity:
individually distinct” or “taking on or having a ﬁnite . . . number of values.”95
Thus, courts should consider whether the subset in question can be thought
of as “individually distinct” from the other subsets that fall within the
statutorily charge. The Supreme Court’s reﬁnement of “discrete” in its equal
protection jurisprudence may be a useful guide. In the famous “Footnote
Four” of United States v. Carolene Products Co., the Court observed that certain
legislation could give rise to a higher level of scrutiny than rational basis
review when it prejudiced “discrete and insular minorities.”96 Professor Bruce
Ackerman helpfully deﬁned the Court’s understanding of “discrete” as
referring to
members [that] are marked out in ways that make it relatively easy for others
to identify them. For instance, there is nothing a black woman may plausibly
do to hide the fact that she is black or female. Like it or not, she will have to

See generally Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
Id. at 845.
Discrete, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/discrete [https://perma.cc/H5HR-GWAR] (last visited on Apr. 14, 2019).
96 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
93
94
95
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deal with the social expectations and stereotypes generated by her evident
group characteristics.97

If evident minority characteristics associated with discrimination are the
mark of discreteness in the constitutional context, courts can ask what makes
subsets “evident” in the administrative law context. For example, is the subset
one that has emerged recently? If so, judicial review could help clarify the
agency’s relationship to it. Does the subset carry sizeable economic
consequences? If so, that may make review a worthwhile expenditure of judicial
resources. Does the subset implicate the agency’s ability to faithfully carry out
its mission? All subsets theoretically do, but those that especially do should merit
more attention. These questions are a starting point with room for refinement
rather than an exhaustive list. Over time, because agencies are repeat players in
the courts, parties can develop a working expectation of what is “discrete” that
maps onto the unique specialties of each agency. The point here is that a discrete
subset, by definition, would stand out enough to be worth judicial review.
2. Nonenforcement
A court should analyze nonenforcement on the discrete level in the same
way that it currently analyzes nonenforcement on the statutory level. How
much enforcement is enough? I suggest that this necessarily is a fact-speciﬁc
inquiry. One instance of enforcement in the past year on an issue that rarely
comes up seems to pass. However, one instance of enforcement in the past
year on a common issue with hundreds of missed enforcement opportunities
that the agency refuses to deal with would probably not pass. While “some”
literally means “greater than zero,” “some level” still implies a degree rather
than an absolute count. Another way to think about it is to ask if the agency
demonstrates either total nonenforcement or severe under-enforcement to
the practical eﬀect of nonenforcement.98 However diﬃcult this question may
be, it would not be too demanding for courts, as they are comfortable
conducting this kind of line-drawing inquiry in other contexts.99
Further, the nonenforcement analysis should combine the reasoning of
Line 1 and Line 2. That is, the court should look to what an agency is doing
and what it is saying, on the discrete level. Thus, the court should ask two
questions. First, is there a general nonenforcement policy of the discrete
Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713, 729 (1985).
See Jentry Lanza, Comment, Agency Underenforcement as Reviewable Abdication, 112 NW. U.
L. REV. 1171, 1193-1208 (2018) (explaining why severe underenforcement should be treated as
nonenforcement for purposes of allowing judicial review).
99 See, e.g., Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 171-73 (5th Cir. 2015) (ﬁnding that the
barebones percentage of applicants denied deferred action amounted to evidence that oﬃcials did
not make decisions with discretion), aﬀ ’d by an equally divided Court, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016).
97
98
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subset? Second, is the agency lacking “some level” of enforcement of the
discrete subset? Answering “yes” to either question will trigger discrete look.
The fusion of Line 1 and Line 2 approaches is a straightforward and
sensible rule for courts to use. As it stands, neither Line is satisfactory on its
own in closely tracking instances of agency nonenforcement behavior. Line 1
is more robust because it allows the court to look at what an agency is doing.
However, one weakness of Line 1 is illuminated when an agency may be
confronted with a new issue—too new for it to have some level of
enforcement. The agency can persuasively argue that it is not abdicating its
duty; rather, the issue is so new that the agency has not even had an
opportunity to refuse enforcement. Line 2 can address this “temporality”
problem by looking to what an agency says, which provides the clearest
indication of nonenforcement behavior. However, its ﬂaw is that its
determination of abdication rests solely on what an agency says. In eﬀect, the
agency can control whether it will be subject to judicial review. Together, a
hybrid rule will allow courts to supplement Line 1 analysis with the rarer
instances of Line 2 analysis. Compared to the status quo of mutually exclusive
Lines, this fusion helpfully expands instances of judicial review.
3. Violation
Plaintiffs should only be allowed to challenge agency inaction when the
agency is refusing to take enforcement action against a private party’s violation.
Limiting this rule to violations directly addresses the concerns of Norton v.
Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance.100 In that case, plaintiff challenged the Bureau
of Land Management (“BLM”)’s refusal to ban off-road vehicles in designated
areas, arguing that BLM needed to enforce this ban to fulfill its statutory duty
of wilderness preservation.101 However, nothing in the text of BLM’s statutory
charge required it to ban off-road vehicles. The Court held that BLM had broad
discretion to decide how to achieve wilderness preservation, making BLM’s
rejection of plaintiff’s “programmatic” proposal unreviewable.102 The Court
worried that to allow judicial review of an agency’s rejection of a programmatic
proposal “would ultimately become the task of the supervising court, rather
than the agency, to work out compliance with the broad statutory mandate,
injecting the judge into day-to-day agency management.”103
A violation is qualitatively diﬀerent from a programmatic proposal. A
violation by deﬁnition has contradicted the regulatory scheme; a proposal is
simply one suggestion for how an agency should handle its regulatory scheme.
100
101
102
103

542 U.S. 55 (2004).
Id. at 60-61.
Id. at 64, 67.
Id. at 66-67.
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Agencies are tasked with addressing violations, but it is up to them to decide
which proposals to adopt. An agency can consistently reject a line of policy
suggestions, because as the expert in the ﬁeld, it can choose how to best
achieve its enforcement duties. By contrast, an agency that consistently
refuses to enforce a line of violations does not look like it is doing its job.
4. Unitary Regulatory Scheme
Even after plaintiﬀ satisﬁes the ﬁrst three elements of this test, courts
should only allow review if plaintiﬀ has no other recourse through an
overlapping regulatory scheme. An agency may choose not to act for a variety
of valid reasons, one of which is that it made a calculation that its inaction is
not the ﬁnal word in the context of a broader regulatory scheme. Although
agencies specialize, few issues today are covered or solvable by only one
agency. One of the main functions of the Oﬃce of Information and
Regulatory Aﬀairs (“OIRA”) is to smooth out inter-agency policies to ensure
that they work together.104 The same can be said for the executive branch’s
international regulatory scheme.105 Regulatory schemes are thus intricate and
complex. One agency’s inaction may actually be in purposeful horizontal
coordination with another agency’s action. When performing this analysis,
courts should ask if there really is an overlapping regulatory scheme.106
Sometimes it may appear so because of general subject-matter similarities,
but if Congress only gave one agency the regulatory tools such that no other
agency can provide similar relief for similar claims, then the regulatory
scheme is unitary.
Regulatory overlap may also exist vertically across federal and state
governments. A federal agency may choose not to act because it determines
that a state engages in its own regulatory activity in that ﬁeld, and therefore
federal action would be redundant and wasteful. However, vertical overlap is
less likely to be satisfactory. This is because state action may vary in its
purposes and scope from federal action and might not actually cover the ﬁeld
the agency has a duty to regulate. Further, a lawsuit may feature multiple
plaintiﬀs, some of whom come from states with regulatory schemes while
others do not, in which case the vertical overlap would have “holes” requiring
federal action to ﬁll. To address these concerns, the court should simply
104 Oﬃce of Management and Budget, Information and Regulatory Aﬀairs, THE WHITE HOUSE
(last visited Apr. 14, 2019), https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/information-regulatory-aﬀairs/
[https://perma.cc/JK8A-BSQR].
105 See generally Exec. Order No. 13609, 77 Fed. Reg. 26,413 (May 1, 2012) (dividing authority
amongst and ensuring coordination among numerous federal agencies in the natural defense space).
106 One court did so in a recent case. See Riverkeeper, Inc. v. Collins, 359 F.3d 156, 161 nn.4-5 (2d
Cir. 2004) (considering the relationship other agencies may have in fulfilling the regulatory scheme).
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presume that no vertical regulatory overlap exists. The federal agency can
rebut this presumption by providing the court with suﬃcient evidence of
state regulatory activity in every state from which plaintiﬀs sue. As with
horizontal regulatory overlap, the federal agency here has the most knowledge
of what regulatory activity already exists in states. If it not acting because it
sees that states are already doing something, then surely it can point the court
to what it is that the states in question are doing.
***
Discrete look borrows procedurally from the Court’s burden-shifting
mechanism in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett.107 In summary judgment, the movant
need only to point to an absence of a dispute of material fact to get the motion
considered. The non-movant then responds with aﬃrmative evidence of a
dispute of material fact. The court then decides the motion. This is not an
empty standard, but it is understandably lenient.
Likewise, here the plaintiﬀ must show a negative. The ﬁrst way to do so
is to point to a general nonenforcement policy. The second is to show that the
agency’s enforcement level has not reached the “some level” standard
discussed above. For new issues, the ﬁrst way alleviates the temporality
problem. If that avenue is not available, plaintiﬀs can try to persuade the
court that an issue is ripe for abdication analysis by pointing to the number
of years or potential number of cases that have elapsed since the time the
agency was ﬁrst on notice about the issue. Coordinated litigation can also
demonstrate a pattern of refusals to enforce. If hundreds of death row inmates
ﬁle individual complaints before the FDA and receive refusals to enforce,
then that leaves a record of nonenforcement.
If the plaintiﬀ satisﬁes the negative showing, the agency must then
respond. It can provide an aﬃrmative showing of some level of enforcement,
contest any allegations of a general nonenforcement policy, or argue under
Chevron that the subset is not part of an ambiguous statutory charge. Finally,
it can provide a persuasive explanation of how an overlapping regulatory
scheme justiﬁes the agency’s inaction in this particular case. The court must
then decide whether to allow judicial review. If so, the review is what the
court normally conducts for agency action: arbitrary and capricious review,
which includes fact-ﬁnding, full brieﬁng by both parties, hearings with crossexamination, discovery, expert witnesses, and more.108 If the court ﬁnds that
477 U.S. 317 (1986).
For examples of how courts conduct arbitrary and capricious review, see generally F.C.C.
v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502 (2009); Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S., Inc.
v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
107
108
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the agency’s inaction is arbitrary and capricious, it can order the agency to
increase the level of enforcement of the discrete subset. In more egregious or
straightforward cases, it can also grant the speciﬁc relief plaintiﬀ requests.
This Section proposed the discrete look rule and discussed how courts could
apply it in practice. The rule offers a constrained and targeted form of judicial
review in cases that might require some kind of judicial scrutiny. The next
Section specifically applies discrete look to potential cases in which death row
inmates would sue the FDA for refusing to regulate compounded lethal drugs.
B. Discrete Look Applied
This Section applies discrete look to the issue speciﬁcally addressed in
this Comment: the use of lethal compounded drugs in state executions of
inmates. This Section shows that a typical case brought by inmates against
the FDA challenging the lack of regulation of these drugs in executions would
satisfy the four elements of discrete look. As such, FDA inaction toward
compounded lethal drugs should be subject to judicial review.
1. Discrete
First, compounded lethal drugs are clearly a subset of new drugs that the
FDA is tasked to regulate. Applying Chevron, a court will likely find that “drug”
is not ambiguous from the statutory text. The FDA may argue that
compounded lethal drugs are not really “drugs” to begin with, because drugs
are meant to heal, not kill people. This is a weak argument, because it turns out
that the FDCA defines the term: “The term ‘drug’ means . . . articles (other
than food) intended to affect the structure or any function of the body of man
or other animals . . . .”109 Since compounded lethal drugs clearly aim to affect a
human being’s body, they are unambiguously a subset of new drugs. The phrase
“compounded lethal drugs” is an apt description rather than a misnomer.
Second, compounded lethal drugs form a discrete subset. They are
“individually distinct” because of their unique characteristics. For starters,
the subset is new, as compounded lethal drugs have only emerged since
2012.110 Second, it would be helpful for the courts to clarify the relationship
the FDA has to compounded lethal drugs. Third, compounded lethal drugs
carry sizeable economic consequences because not only do they sustain the
administration of lethal injection in the states, their proliferation into illicit
supply chains can trigger all sorts of disruptive and costly eﬀects for

109
110

21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1) (2018).
See Compounding Pharmacies, supra note 42.
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regulators.111 Moreover, this subset implicates the public reliance on the
agency to faithfully carry out its mission. The FDA’s mission, according to its
website, is to “protect[] the public health by ensuring the safety, eﬃcacy, and
security of human and veterinary drugs, biological products, and medical
devices . . . .”112 A court does not need to reach far to see that compounded
lethal drugs, both as they are used to kill people and as distributed into illicit
supply chains, strongly implicate the FDA mission. Thus, if any subset of
new drugs stands out as discrete under these questions, compounded lethal
drugs must surely be it.
2. Nonenforcement
The FDA has not expressly articulated a general nonenforcement policy,
and it is not likely that a court would start inferring general policies from
documents on Crowley’s disfavored list. Even if it did, the FDA could still
avoid judicial review on this front by avoiding articulating anything
resembling a general policy in its nonenforcement letters, litigation
documents, and the like.
The better option for litigants is to argue that the FDA has not engaged
in some level of enforcement of compounded lethal drugs. According to a
2016 GAO study, from 2012 through 2016 the FDA completed 265 inspections
of small compounders and other drug compounders.113 The GAO report made
no mention of FDA regulation of compounded lethal drugs. The primary
news story tying the FDA to lethal injection was about a compounder in
Missouri called Apothecary that shut down in 2016 after the FDA and state
inspectors found a host of unsanitary practices.114
The FDA can argue that it engaged in some level of regulating
compounded lethal drugs when its inspections of Apothecary led to the
seizure of some compounded lethal drugs. It can also argue that its general
enforcement action (inspecting a compounder for violations) included
enforcement of a discrete subset (seizing compounded lethal drugs).

111 Yadav, supra note 13, at 479 (“The secrecy surrounding the execution drug procurement
practices of death-penalty states risks undermining channels for the importation of medicines that
are otherwise safe and eﬀective.”).
112 What We Do, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/about-fda/what-we-do/
[https://perma.cc/4GVL-CF4A] (last updated Mar. 28, 2018).
113 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-17-64, DRUG COMPOUNDING: FDA HAS
TAKEN STEPS TO IMPLEMENT COMPOUNDING LAW, BUT SOME STATES AND STAKEHOLDERS
REPORTED CHALLENGES 40 (2016).
114 See Chris McDaniel, Pharmacy That Mixed Executions Drugs Is Being Sold After Admitting
Numerous Violations, BUZZFEED NEWS (Apr. 21, 2016, 10:45 PM), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/
article/chrismcdaniel/pharmacy-that-mixed-execution-drugs-is-being-sold-after-disc [https://perma.cc/
H77K-95NN].
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However, the Apothecary inspection is unpersuasive evidence of “some
level” of enforcement for two reasons. First, it provides only one episode
when the FDA interacted with compounded lethal drugs. That hardly
appears to establish a minimum level of enforcement, given the established
presence of compounders as the main supplier of lethal drugs since 2012.115
Second, the FDA’s regulatory connection with compounded lethal drugs
appeared fortuitous. The FDA’s impetus for investigation seemed to stem
from a host of violations (unrelated to compounded lethal drugs) rather than
the fact that Apothecary also happened to compound lethal drugs on the
side.116 The FDA’s inspection letter to Apothecary117 focused primarily on the
fact that the compounder did not have individual prescription orders for
individually-identiﬁed patients and did not maintain a clean environment for
compounding.118 As further evidence that the FDA targeted Apothecary for
its general compounding practices, the compounder ended up admitting guilt
to an astounding 1,892 violations of state pharmacy guidelines.119 The
inspection letter never mentions lethal injection. To be clear, the motive or
expectation of the regulator does not necessarily control how “some level” of
enforcement is counted. However, given that Apothecary is a stand-alone
case, the motive of the FDA in its regulatory action helps to make sense of
what kind of regulatory action it was taking.
Alternatively, the FDA can argue that it has engaged in some level of
regulating compounded lethal drugs by pointing out that it has at least one such
compounded drug on its list of banned substances.120 High dosage potassium
chloride, which appears on this list, can be used as the third and final drug in
lethal injections that stop the heart.121 This is also a weak argument. For states
that use three drugs in lethal injection, potassium chloride is only the last

See Compounding Pharmacies, supra note 42.
The same can be said for Greenpark, a compounding pharmacy that an undercover news story
revealed was supplying compounded lethal drugs to Texas. See McDaniel, supra note 12. Compared to
Apothecary, Greenpark is even more tenuous evidence of FDA regulation because (1) there is no evidence
that the FDA seized compounded lethal drugs from it and (2) the FDA identified only a handful of
sanitary issues, suggesting that the inspection was something like a routine checkup.
117 Warning Letter from Amy Barringer, Acting Dallas Dist. Dir., Pub. Health Serv., Food & Drug
Admin. to Thomas Marti, President, The Apothecary Shoppe (Aug. 19, 2016), https://www.fda.gov/
inspections-compliance-enforcement-and-criminal-investigations/warning-letters/apothecary-shoppellc-474607-08192016 [https://perma.cc/V6U5-6XEY].
118 Id.
119 McDaniel, supra note 114.
120 See 21 C.F.R. 216.24 (2018) (banning the compounding of “[a]ll solid oral dosage form
drug products containing potassium chloride that supply 100 milligrams or more of potassium
per dosage unit”).
121 Atul Gawande et al., Physicians and Execution—Highlights from a Discussion of Lethal Injection,
NEW ENG. J. MED. (Jan. 31, 2008), https://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/nejmp0800378 [https://
perma.cc/56KW-DD46].
115
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drug.122 None of the other drugs commonly used in lethal injection appear on
the banned list. For example, midazolam, which renders the inmate
unconscious, has been the predominant choice in three-drug executions in the
past few years.123 Midazolam is not on the FDA’s banned list, even though the
dosage levels with which compounders produce it is only useful for the
purposes of execution.124 Potassium chloride’s appearance on the FDA’s banned
compounding list—conspicuously alone—may be more attributable to the
FDA’s general concern about the drug’s potency at high dosages rather than a
specific concern about its use in lethal injection.
The FDA can try a temporality argument, but it will likely fail. The ﬁrst
recorded instance of lethal injection by compounded lethal drugs occurred in
2012.125 The court would likely think that enough time and opportunities have
passed for enforcement such that the FDA has had the opportunity to
demonstrate a pattern of nonenforcement. Since 2012, at least several dozen
executions have used compounded lethal drugs, implying that many more
compounded drugs have been produced and distributed without any
regulatory oversight by the FDA.126 Enough time has elapsed to demonstrate
that the FDA has consistently refused to regulate here.
3. Violation
The FDA’s discrete nonenforcement here is toward a violation and not a
programmatic proposal. As shown above, compounded lethal drugs are new
drugs, and compounders are not exempt from new drug regulations because
they do not have valid individual prescription orders. By producing and
distributing these drugs outside of the FDA’s lengthy and costly new drug
approval process, compounders violate the FDA’s new drug regulations.
4. Unitary Regulatory Scheme
On the federal level, the FDA’s website recognizes that the “FDA’s
responsibilities are closely related to those of several other government
agencies.”127 From the FDA’s descriptions of these agencies’ duties, however,
Id.
See, e.g., Execution List 2018, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/
executions/2017 [https://perma.cc/5EZJ-F3E9] (last visited Oct. 21, 2019).
124 See, e.g., Gray v. McAuliffe, No. 3:16CV982-HEH, 2017 WL 102970, at *9 (E.D. Va. Jan. 10,
2017) (“The VDOC will use 500 mg of midazolam as its first-stage drug in the three-drug lethal
injection protocol. Midazolam is used as a sedative. It is a central nervous system and respiratory
depressant . . . . much smaller amounts of midazolam are used for medicinal or therapeutic purposes.”).
125 See Compounding Pharmacies, supra note 42.
126 Id.
127 What Does FDA Regulate?, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/aboutfda/
transparency/basics/ucm194879.htm [https://perma.cc/8QLN-Q9ZW] (last updated Mar. 28, 2018).
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only the Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”) shares jurisdiction with
the FDA on the subject of drugs.128 The DEA is tasked with regulating ﬁve
categories of controlled substances that are listed by statute.129 Compounded
lethal drugs do not fall within that list.130 This issue is therefore outside of
the DEA’s jurisdiction. Without other federal agencies in play, the FDA’s
inaction is in a unitary regulatory scheme, unless the states are involved.
On the state level, a regulatory vacuum, rather than a regulatory overlap,
exists. The same article in the Journal of the American Pharmacists Association
that warned against illicit supply chains also noted that “[t]hese execution
secrecy laws and policies, which have been implemented by twenty-three of
thirty-one states with the death penalty, eﬀectively—and in some cases
explicitly—exempt the suppliers of lethal injection drugs from oversight by
state boards of pharmacy.”131 The growth of laws amongst the states that
shield compounders from identiﬁcation and regulation shows how void the
regulatory scheme has become and consequently how urgent the need is for
the FDA to regulate in this space. Even if a few of the states with the death
penalty may be engaging in some regulatory oversight of their compounders,
discrete look would treat this as a unitary regulatory scheme, at least for
litigation that includes plaintiﬀs from states with an exemption law.
This Section showed how this case satisﬁes discrete look and therefore
can be subject to judicial review. The next Section explains the broader
implications discrete look has for administrative law.
C. Discrete Look Justified
This Section discusses the general benefits of allowing targeted judicial
review under discrete look in administrative law and refutes the notion that
it asks too much of the courts. It also demonstrates that discrete look beats
alternative approaches to judicial review that would impose too much of a
burden on the courts.
Where an agency has decided that it will not enforce discrete subsets of a
statutory charge, the courts should have the ability to conduct arbitrary and
capricious review, in the same way that a court would do so for affirmative
enforcement actions. We should not think of agency duties as either all-ornothing on the level of the statute, but rather as an assortment of responsibilities
128 Id. (“The Department of Justice’s Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) works to
enforce the controlled substances laws and regulations of the United States, including as they pertain
to the manufacture, distribution, and dispensing of legally produced controlled substances.”).
129 See 21 U.S.C. § 802(6) (2018) (“The term ‘controlled substance’ means a drug or other
substance, or immediate precursor, included in schedule I, II, III, IV, or V . . . .”).
130 Id.
131 Yadav, supra note 13.
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that Congress included under a statute for the agency to regulate. Courts should
have the power to question an agency’s job performance when it consistently
refuses to enforce some issues under its jurisdiction.132
Discrete look beneﬁts the public, the agency, and Congress. Litigation
using discrete look can force an agency to provide an aﬃrmative showing of
some level of enforcement or an explanation of the overlapping regulatory
scheme. This allows the public to better understand an agency’s enforcement
priorities on discrete issues that may otherwise be swallowed by broader
statutory charges. Increased knowledge of agency inaction also empowers
lobbying for change and accountability through the political process. Most
concretely, plaintiﬀs in these cases are often members of the public asking for
regulation. They beneﬁt from having an opportunity to see some kind of
regulation that directly aﬀects their interests.
The agency benefits, too. An agency might be the expert, but that does not
mean it is always doing the best resource allocation and priority-setting. Having
to explain its reasons helps the agency identify inconsistencies and inaccurate
assumptions in its enforcement priorities. Even the specter of litigation could
incentivize the agency to give its enforcement levels a second look. Because an
agency will have a duty to show some levels of enforcement, it may choose to
preemptively publish reports of its discrete enforcement levels, or at least keep
internal files in anticipation of litigation. An agency may also try to gain a
better understanding of its own overlapping regulatory schemes and when
certain issues belong to a unitary scheme. Just as judicial review provides
external pressure to an agency to consider its reasons for action, so here would
it incentivize the agency to consider its reasons for inaction.
Discrete look also beneﬁts Congress. Congress is frequently silent because
it faces collective action problems and scattered priorities, but its silence
should not always be understood as aﬃrmative approval of agency inaction.133
Without further instruction, an agency might exercise discrete
nonenforcement because it does not really think that Congress mandated it to
regulate the subset. If litigation causes frequent shifts in resource allocation
between X, Y, and Z, this can be a strong signal to Congress to provide more
funding or clarify the agency’s mandate. Indeed, if some enforcement
priorities become tethered to who happens to have won in court, Congress

132 Cf. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 833 n.4 (1985) (explaining that the presumption against
judicial review of agency inaction can be overcome when the agency “consciously and expressly
adopted a general policy that is so extreme as to amount to an abdication of its statutory
responsibilities” (citing Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en banc))).
133 Cf. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 155 (2000) (“Indeed, this
is not a case of simple inaction by Congress that purportedly represents its acquiescence in an
agency’s position.”).
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may be alerted to conduct a more programmatic assessment about
enforcement priorities.
Despite its beneﬁts, one might ask if discrete look is worth the trouble for
the courts. A judge may think that this rule would be too intrusive a test to
ask courts to perform. In principle, if courts are already hesitant to ﬁnd
abdication on the face of a statute, they could be even more reluctant to look
into the weeds to examine whether an agency is enforcing each discrete
subset. Courts might think that it is not their job to probe beneath the surface
of a statute where Congress has not delineated the subject matter in more
detail in the statute itself. Practically, courts might be concerned about what
makes a subset discrete. Absent some clear limiting principle, the courts could
ﬁnd themselves knee-deep in the sort of agency micromanagement that the
Supreme Court in Chaney wanted the judicial branch to avoid. Three
responses assuage these concerns.
First, the unwillingness of circuit courts to find abdication may say less
about how deferential courts are to agencies and more about how easy it is for
agencies to satisfy the existing test. It is easy for the agency to maintain a
barebone level of enforcement at the statutory level. Statutory charges are by
nature broad, allowing the agency to easily meet a minimum level of
enforcement. This could possibly account for the enormous difficulty of
plaintiffs’ ability to get review. Once the court can look to the discrete level,
however, an agency can no longer rely on the fact that it is still minimally
enforcing the statute generally. It cannot simply increase enforcement levels in
any subset it wishes in order to raise its overall enforcement level. The court’s
analysis becomes more piercing because it looks solely to what an agency has
done or not done with respect to the discrete subset in question. As a result,
the point of reference has narrowed. Under discrete look, abdication analysis is
likely to have stronger teeth because agencies will predictably have gaps within
their statutory charge that they are not filling at all.
Second, discrete look only asks a court to probe deeper into an existing
framework. Courts will still ask if there is some level of enforcement or a
general nonenforcement policy. However, the inquiry is not limited at the
statutory level but extends toward the more granular perspective of the
discrete subset. The status quo under Chaney’s Lines already asks courts to
see if there is some level of enforcement or a general nonenforcement policy.
The only further task that discrete look requires courts to perform is
operationalizing what makes a subset discrete. This involves asking standardbased questions, which courts are familiar with doing in other contexts.
Further, analysis at the discrete level is not entirely new to the judiciary.
While no Line 1 or Line 2 circuit court has performed abdication analysis on
the discrete level, at least one district court has. In PETA v. USDA, the
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District Court for the District of Columbia examined whether the USDA was
abdicating its statutory charge under the Animal Welfare Act (“AWA”).134
The plaintiﬀs sued the USDA for its decade-long refusal to regulate bird
abuse.135 Had the court followed Line 1, it could have simply concluded that
the USDA did maintain some level of enforcement against animal abuse
generally and ended the inquiry there. But the court chose to analyze agency
nonenforcement as it related speciﬁcally to birds.136 PETA is not a direct
example of discrete look, however, because birds were speciﬁcally deﬁned as
one of the animals to be regulated under the AWA, whereas here compounded
lethal drugs are not speciﬁcally deﬁned as a type of new drug. But the court’s
exercise of probing deeper—speciﬁcally to birds as opposed to animals in
general—is still instructive.
Third, discrete look would not overly burden the courts or agencies with
lawsuits. Plaintiffs must make certain threshold showings before requiring the
agency to respond. And even then, the court may still refuse judicial review if
the agency refutes this showing, persuades the court that the regulatory
scheme is not unitary, or questions whether the subset truly belongs to the
whole. These hurdles mean that frivolous cases will not clog the court’s docket
because they can be disposed of quickly without reaching the stage of arbitrary
and capricious review.
As a ﬁnal thought, discrete look is a modest reﬁnement of Chaney
compared to alternative proposals that would get plaintiﬀs into court. This
Comment rejects eliminating Chaney’s presumption of unreviewability
altogether by suggesting, for example, that courts should review agency
inaction in the same way as agency action.137 That would ﬂood the courts and
paralyze the agencies in their day-to-day decision-making. This Comment
also rejects allowing judicial review of all agency inaction with extra deference
to the agency, as Justice Marshall suggested in his concurrence in Chaney.138
That would still drown the courts with lawsuits, because courts could not
dismiss cases at the threshold question of judicial reviewability.
The problem with these alternative proposals is that they burn the forest
to get the tree. Discrete look is calculated: it looks at a consistent pattern of
agency nonenforcement over time or a general nonenforcement policy, rather
7 F. Supp. 3d 1, 5-6 (D.D.C. 2013).
Id.
Id.
See, e.g., Lisa Schultz Bressman, Judicial Review of Agency Inaction: An Arbitrariness Approach,
79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1657, 1657 (2004) (suggesting that courts should “eschew any special prohibitions
on judicial review of agency inaction, and instead subject agency inaction to the same principles of
judicial review that apply to agency action”).
138 See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 840 (1985) (Marshall, J., concurring) (“I write
separately to argue for a diﬀerent basis of decision: that refusals to enforce, like any other agency
actions, are reviewable . . . but that such refusals warrant deference . . . .”).
134
135
136
137
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than every individual instance of nonenforcement. Discrete look is also
targeted: it focuses on discrete subsets of a statutory charge, recognizing that
agencies can abdicate their duties by consistently not enforcing a discrete
subset. That makes litigation more focused and less prone to endless
discovery. Thus, discrete look preserves the basic policy motivations behind
Chaney while giving courts power to conduct some form of judicial review.
This Section described the contribution of discrete look to administrative
law. Discrete look is a modest rule that benefits various actors in the
administrative context, and it is the kind of probing that courts are
competent to perform.
CONCLUSION
When death row inmates sue the FDA for its inaction toward
compounded lethal drugs, the court should grant judicial review. The FDA
has to make tough calls about its enforcement priorities, but consistently
choosing not to enforce a discrete subset of new drugs should not be a choice
that is immune from judicial review. Because Congress set up a framework that
empowers the FDA to regulate compounded lethal drugs, the agency should not
be able to refuse to enforce the law without expecting some judicial review.
There will always be hard cases about what counts as “some” level of
enforcement, about temporality, and about what makes a subset discrete. But
hard questions do not eliminate the need for general principles. Discrete look
does not make the question any harder as it largely adapts the existing case
law into a more sensible standard. Finally, it suﬃces to say that when the
FDA has essentially no level of enforcement over a subset that could hardly
stand out more, this is not a hard case.
While the death penalty is a controversial issue, botched executions and
illicit supply chains are not controversial. They are harms that merit regulation,
or at least judicial review for a lack of regulation. Whatever salience this topic
has outside the courts, it comes in very standard administrative law terms. Here,
as in the rest of administrative law, it is still the “province and duty” of the courts
to remind the agency “what the law is.”139
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Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).

